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a decade-old open question. Secondly, we ask if sequential play and subgame perfection allows to evade
worst-case Nash equilibria, and thereby reduces the price of anarchy. This is motivated by positive results
for congestion games with a small number of players, as well as recent results for other resource allocation
problems. Our main result is the perhaps surprising proof that subgame perfect equilibria of sequential
symmetric network routing games with linear cost functions can have an unbounded price of anarchy. We
complete the picture by analyzing the case with two players: We show that the sequential price of anarchy
equals 7/5, and that computing the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium is NP-hard.
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1. Introduction The concept of the price of anarchy (PoA), introduced by Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou [27, 28], has spurred a significant amount of research over the past two decades and
has contributed to establishing the area algorithmic game theory. In its original version, one relates
the outcome of a worst-case Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game with selfish players to that
of an optimal, centrally computable solution, using as metric some global objective function defined
on the set of possible outcomes of the game. It is well known that the lack of central coordination,
translated into solutions that arise as Nash equilibria, can lead to substantial efficiency losses. This
remains true even if the global objective function is the sum of the objective functions of all players.
In their highly influential work, Roughgarden and Tardos [35] prove that the price of anarchy
for “non-atomic” network routing games with affine cost functions is exactly 4/3. The equilibrium
concept in non-atomic network routing is Wardrop’s equilibrium, meaning that only minimum cost
paths can have nonzero flow [37]. Wardrop equilibria possess a simple characterization through
variational inequalities that has been extensively used to derive price of anarchy results, e.g. [14].
Furthermore, they can be thought of as the limiting case of a Nash equilibrium where the total
flow is routed by infinitely many players, each responsible for an infinitesimally small amount of
flow. This variational inequality approach was shortly after used to pin down, to 5/2, the price of
anarchy of the “atomic” counterpart of the network routing problem [7, 6, 12].
This paper focuses on finite congestion games with affine cost functions, and specifically its
special case, atomic network routing with linear cost functions. A congestion game consists of set
of n players, and a set of m resources, and each player is equipped with a feasibility system of
subsets of the resources that describes the feasible choices that are available for that player. The
cost of a resource is an affine, non-negative function that depends on the number of players that
choose that resource. A solution consists of a choice of a feasible subset for each of the players, and
the total cost of a player is the sum of the costs of all chosen resources. The total cost of the system
is the sum of the costs of all players. In the special case of atomic network routing, the resources
are arcs in a digraph, and each of the n players is interested in establishing one origin-destination
path. The game is symmetric if all players have the same feasibility system, and translated into
network routing, that means that all players have the same origin and destination. For general
congestion games with affine cost functions, the price of anarchy (PoA) is known to be equal to
5/2 for n≥ 3 players [7, 6, 12], and it is at most (5n− 2)/(2n+ 1) if the game is symmetric [12].
This paper first closes a gap in the literature by showing that (5n−2)/(2n+1) is indeed the exact
price of anarchy for symmetric network routing games. The major part of this paper, however, is
dedicated to the question what effect sequential decision making has on the quality of the resulting
equilibria. Let us next elaborate on the relevance of this question.
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One motivation to address the effect of sequential decision making lies in a set of recent publica-
tions, led by Paes Leme et al. [33]. They made the proposal to consider sequential versions of finite,
n-player games, and to analyze subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of such sequential games,
instead of Nash equilibria of the simultaneous move strategic form games. Roughly speaking, sub-
game perfect equilibria represent the rational outcomes of a sequential game where all players act
farsighted and strategically [36]. The driver behind this proposal is the insight that some of the
Nash equilibria of the strategic form game cannot be realized as subgame perfect equilibria of the
sequential version of the game. That leads to the notion of the sequential price of anarchy, intro-
duced by Paes Leme et al. [33], which could be smaller than the price of anarchy. Similar to the
price of anarchy (PoA) [27, 28], the sequential price of anarchy (SPoA, for short) measures the cost
of decentralization. However, while the price of anarchy compares the quality of a worst case Nash
equilibrium to the quality of an optimal solution, the sequential price of anarchy considers the
possible outcomes of a game where players choose their strategies sequentially, in some arbitrary
(albeit fixed) order. It then relates the quality of the outcome of the worst possible subgame perfect
equilibrium taken over all possible orders of the players to the quality of an optimal solution. Note
that for games with perfect information which we consider here, subgame perfect equilibria can be
computed via backwards induction. Although this is conceptually simple, it raises an important
challenge when compared to the understanding of Nash or Wardrop equilibria, the main difficulty
being the absence of a simple characterization such as the variational inequality mentioned earlier.
It turns out that there are interesting examples of games where sequential play and subgame
perfection can lead to substantially improved guarantees on the price of anarchy, and in this sense
allow to avoid what has been called the “curse of simultaneity” [33]. Indeed, for a handful of games,
the SPoA has been proven to be lower than the PoA [33, 16, 15]. For some others, however, this
turns out to be opposite [2, 1, 11, 10].
The motivation to analyze the sequential price of anarchy also for congestion games, and specif-
ically for atomic network routing games, is two-fold.
First, de Jong and Uetz [15] considered general congestion games with affine cost functions and
showed that the sequential price of anarchy (SPoA) is equal to 1.5 for two players, and equal to
2+ 63
488
for three players. That means in particular that worst-case Nash equilibria are not realizable
by farsighted players in sequential play. In [15] it is further conjectured that the SPoA for affine
congestion games is below 5/2, for any number of players. Yet the only known upper bound on the
the SPoA for an arbitrary number of players is -trivially- the number of players, n.
Second, in practical situations it often seems that sequential decision making is a more realistic
model in comparison to simultaneous single shot games. This is certainly true for applications
such as traffic and load balancing, where autonomous decisions are typically taken on top of an
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existing and known load of the resources, but future decisions of other players are to be expected.
The model that we consider is an abstraction of such concrete applications, and specifically asks
what the effect is if all n players act sequentially and fully farsighted. We believe it is important
to understand the effect of sequential play and subgame perfection in this basic setting.
Our results. As a first result, this paper answers a question that was posed, among others,
by Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [12] and Bhawalkar et al. [8, 9], and that had remained an
open problem for more than a decade. Indeed, it was open if the price of anarchy bound 5/2
can also be attained (asymptotically) with symmetric network routing games, and if the upper
bound (5n − 2)/(2n + 1) of Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [12] is tight. We close this gap, by
deriving a lower bound equal to (5n− 2)/(2n+ 1) for symmetric, atomic network routing games
with linear cost functions. We thereby exactly match the upper bound that was known for the case
of symmetric (not necessarily network) congestion games [12]. This asymptotically matches the
upper bound 5/2 that is known for n≥ 3 players for the asymmetric network routing case [6, 12].
As to the quality of equilibria for sequentially played congestion games, we show the following.
First, we pin down the exact sequential price of anarchy for the symmetric network routing case
with n= 2 players, showing that it equals 7/5. This constitutes an improvement over the 3/2 bound
that is known for the more general, non-symmetric case [15]. For a large number of players however,
and in sharp contrast to what was conjectured in [15], we show that congestion games, and even
symmetric network routing games, have an unbounded sequential price of anarchy. Indeed, we prove
that even in the symmetric network routing case, i.e., when all players share the same origin and
destination, the sequential price of anarchy can be as large as Ω(
√
n). In view of earlier results that
compare Nash to subgame perfect equilibria [33, 16, 15], this establishes an unexpectedly sharp
separation between Nash and subgame perfect equilibria for network routing games. Subsequent
recent work by Groenland and Scha¨fer [20] suggests that the presence of ties seems to be pivotal
for the existence of such worst case instances.
The crucial part of the proof of our main result is to come up with a “contingency plan of actions”
for every player and every possible profile of actions of all previous players that indeed leads to
a subgame perfect outcome. This is generally difficult, since the strategies of the players are of
exponential size. We are however able to design a plan leading to an unbounded SPoA that can
be described in a succinct manner: The core idea, that we believe may be of independent interest,
is to design a “master plan” of actions that all players are supposed to follow, together with a
“punishing” action that players only apply when some previous player deviates from the master
plan. The main technical difficulty is to design a construction such that the punishing actions do
not lead to a higher cost for the player applying it, so that subgame perfection can be achieved.
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To some extent this construction may seem somewhat unrealistic from a practical viewpoint, yet
the main point is to show that such a construction is possible at all for atomic congestion games.
We finally also address the computational complexity of subgame perfection, showing that the
computation of the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium is an NP-hard problem. Although
we know from Paes Leme et al. [33] that computing subgame perfect equilibria can be PSPACE-
hard in general congestion games, that reduction requires a non-constant number of players. Our
result shows that the problem remains at least NP-hard for symmetric network routing games,
and even when the number of players is only two. This contrasts with the fact that a pure Nash
equilibrium can be efficiently computed in these games through a min cost flow computation [17].
Interestingly, our analysis also shows that outcomes of subgame perfect equilibria are generally
not Nash equilibria of the simultaneous single shot game, as opposed to e.g. crowding games as
studied by Milchtaich [31]. Conditions under which this is actually the case for network routing
games have recently been given by Groenland and Scha¨fer [20].
Outline. We first discuss in Section 2 the related literature with respect to the sequential price
of anarchy. We then formally introduce the model along with some necessary preliminary definitions
and insights in Section 3. Section 4 addresses the (non-sequential) atomic network routing game,
and shows that that the regular price of anarchy PoA equals (5n− 2)/(2n+ 1) when the game
is symmetric. In Section 5, we start discussing the sequential network routing game for the case
when there are only n= 2 players. We prove that the sequential price of anarchy is precisely 7/5,
and show that computing an outcome from a subgame perfect equilibrium is NP-hard. In Section
6, we prove the main result of this paper, namely that the sequential price of anarchy SPoA of
symmetric network routing games with linear cost functions is generally unbounded. In Section 7,
we conclude with some remarks and open problems.
2. Related work on the sequential price of anarchy. Network routing games and con-
gestion games form a cornerstone class of problems in the field of algorithmic game theory. Many
variants and extensions on these games have been proposed, and the body of literature on these
games is so large that it is impossible to survey it or summarize its most important articles in this
section. We refer to the recent survey by Fotakis [18], which discusses various results on the price
of anarchy and the price of stability, including more general variants such as weighted congestion
games, nonlinear cost functions, etc. In the remainder of this section, we focus on recent work on
sequential games and subgame perfect equilibria, as the present paper falls most naturally into this
line of research.
The idea to consider subgame perfect equilibria of sequential games as an alternative to rule
out some potentially “unrealistic” Nash equilibria was initiated by Paes Leme et al. [33]. They
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introduced the notion of the sequential price of anarchy SPoA and proved it to be relevant for three
classes of games: In consensus games, players choose one of two alternatives, and gain utility by
picking the same alternative as other players. The authors show that consensus games have a SPoA
of 1 as opposed to an unbounded PoA. In machine cost sharing games with fair cost allocation,
each player chooses a set of machines, and players distribute the cost of each machine equally. The
authors show that the SPoA is Θ(logn), an improvement over the PoA which is equal to n for these
games (where n is the number of players). In unrelated machine scheduling games, each player
controls a job and needs to choose a machine to run the job on. Processing times of the jobs are
machine dependent, and jobs are interested in the total load of the selected machine. Unrelated
machine scheduling games have an unbounded PoA but the SPoA lies in between Ω(
√
n) and m ·2n,
where m is the number of machines. The paper [33] also contains the result that subgame perfect
equilibria are PSPACE-hard to compute in general.
Later, Bilo` et al. [11] showed that the improvements obtained by Paes Leme et al. [33] should be
relativized, as they only hold for the class of generic games1. Specifically, in the non-generic case,
consensus games as well as the related class of cut games have a SPoA of 3, while machine cost
sharing games with fair cost allocation have a SPoA between Ω(n+ 1−Hn) and n, and unrelated
machine scheduling games have a SPoA between 2Ω(
√
n) and 2n. Note that the latter upper bound
is also an improvement for the generic case.
Closest to our work is the study of congestion games with few players by de Jong and Uetz [15].
That paper triggered the question on the actual value of the price of anarchy for atomic congestion
games that is ultimately answered here. The authors of [15] show that for two players the SPoA
equals 3/2 and for three players it equals 2 + 63/488≈ 2.13. Hence, in those cases the SPoA is less
than the PoA which equals 2 and 5/2, respectively [12]. It was conjectured in [15] that the SPoA
for affine congestion games is below 5/2, but Kolev [26] showed that when the number of players
is four or more, the SPoA already exceeds 2.5.
We conclude this introductory section with a brief account of of models for which the effect of
sequential play on the quality or existence of equilibria has been analyzed.
• Hassin and Yovel [23] consider machine scheduling and focus on the special case of related
machines. The authors prove that for this model, the SPoA is at most 2 while the PoA is
Θ(lnn/ ln lnn). Moreover, the SPoA decreases to 4/3 when each machine always executes the
shortest jobs first. Their analysis relies on well known approximation results for list scheduling
by Graham [19].
1 In a generic game the players are never faced with a tie, for any strategy profile of the other players. Thus all
decisions are uniquely determined and in particular uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibria is guaranteed.
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• The effect of sequential play was also analyzed for a throughput scheduling model by de Jong et al.
[16]. There, each player owns a set of machines, and players select jobs with individual values
that must be scheduled in given time windows. The authors show that for identical machine
scheduling, the SPoA is e/(e− 1), an improvement over the PoA, which is 2.
• Avni et al. [5] study another variation of congestion games. The difference is that in their model,
players make multiple, incremental decisions, and each time choose a single resource that extends
the current solution. These decisions are in scheduled phases, and within each phase, the players
make decisions in k≤ n subsequent turns, where at least one player makes a choice in each turn.
In some sense, this model mixes sequential and simultaneous decision making, and the main
results of [5] are on the existence and non-existence of (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibria.
• Rahn and Scha¨fer [34] study tree graph coordination games, where players are nodes in a graph.
Each player chooses a color, and obtains utility equal to the number of neighbors sharing her
color. The authors prove that the SPoA is 2 while the PoA is unbounded.
• Yet another context is that of item bidding games. Here players bid on a set of public projects,
aiming to have their personal preferred project selected. Lucier et al. [30] prove, among other
things, that even though the PoA can be as large as n− 1, any subgame perfect equilibrium in
the sequential version is optimal, yielding a SPoA of 1.
• Isolation games that were studied by Angelucci et al. [1, 2]. These are games in which players
have to choose a point in a metric space, and are interested in maximizing the distance to any
other player. The authors show that, depending on the definition of the players’ utility functions
(sum or mininum distance) and social cost (utilitarian or egalitarian), the SPoA is higher than
the PoA in some cases and lower in other cases.
• Variants of sequential matching games were studied by Haeringer and Wooders [22] and the
very recent paper of Kawase et al. [24, 25]. Haeringer and Wooders [22] characterize Nash and
subgame perfect equilibria in a game where firms sequentially propose workers to be assigned to
them, after which a second stage starts in which the workers make their acceptance and rejection
decisions. Kawase et al. [24] studies the problem to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium in a
similar type of game where the difference is that a worker immediately makes his decision after
each offer. They show various tractability results and PSPACE-hardness results.
• Subsequent to this paper, recent work by Groenland and Scha¨fer [20, 21] suggest to bridge the
gap between far-sighted behaviour and myopic greedy best response behaviour. They assume
that for some parameter k, each player chooses a best response with respect to the action
profile that arises when the k subsequent players play subgame perfectly. The authors establish
conditions under which the action profiles resulting from such behaviour correspond to Nash
equilibria, thereby allowing to import known results for the price of anarchy PoA. In particular,
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for a special class of graphs their work shows that the absence of ties guarantees that subgame
perfect equilibria are also Nash equilibria, and hence have a bounded sequential price of anarchy.
3. Model and notation. Throughout the paper, we consider a special class of finite, atomic
congestion games, namely symmetric atomic network routing games with linear cost functions.
The input of an instance I ∈ I consists of a directed graph G= (V,E), with designated source and
target nodes s, t ∈ V , and for each arc e ∈ E a linear cost (or latency) function ce(y) = aey with
linear cost coefficient ae. That is, the cost of an arc equals ae times the number of players using
it. There are n players that all want to travel from the same origin s to destination t, so that the
possible actions of all players consist of all directed (s, t)-paths in G. Hence, all players have the
same set of actions and the game is symmetric. We will denote by m the number of arcs |E|. We
refer to the path that a player i chooses the action Ai of player i, and A= (A1, . . . ,An) is a vector
with one action for each player, also called an outcome or action profile.
The cost of a player i for choosing a specific (s, t)-path Ai depends on the number of players on
each arc on that path. Specifically, for an outcome A= (A1, . . . ,An), let
ne(A) :=
n∑
i=1
|Ai ∩{e}|
denote the number of players using arc e, then the cost of that arc for each player using it equals
aene(A), and therefore the cost for player i, choosing path Ai, is defined as
ci(A) =
∑
e∈Ai
ae ·ne(A).
For the sake of strengthening some of our results, sometimes we assume that the cost functions are
affine instead of linear2. Affine cost functions are of the form
ci(A) =
∑
e∈Ai
(ae ·ne(A) + be),
where be ≥ 0 can be thought of as a player-independent activation cost associated to an arc e∈E.
We define the social cost of an action profile A as C(A) =
∑n
i=1 ci(A), i.e., the sum of the costs
of the players. In other words, we consider a utilitarian social cost function. This is a standard
model, yet note that it differs from the egalitarian makespan objective as studied, e.g., in [27, 28].
A pure Nash equilibrium is an outcome A in which no player can decrease her costs by unilaterally
deviating, i.e. switching to an action that is different from Ai. The price of anarchy PoA [28, 27]
2 Note that our main results are lower bounds on the price of anarchy and they already apply under linear cost
functions.
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measures the quality of any Nash equilibrium relative to the quality of a globally optimal allocation,
OPT . Here OPT is an outcome minimizing C(·). More specifically, for an instance I,
PoA(I) = max
NE∈NE(I)
C(NE)
C(OPT )
, (1)
where NE(I) denotes the set of all Nash equilibria for instance I. The price of anarchy of a class
of instances I is defined by PoA(I) = supI∈I PoA(I).
In this paper our goal is to evaluate the quality of subgame perfect equilibria of an induced
extensive form game that we call the sequential version of the game [29, 36]. In the sequential
game, players choose an action from the set of (s, t)-paths, but instead of doing so simultaneously,
they choose their actions in an arbitrary predefined order 1,2, . . . , n, so that the i-th player must
choose action Ai, observing the actions of players preceding i, but of course not knowing the
actions of the players succeeding her. However, since players are fully rational and fully informed,
at equilibrium they anticipate the sucessors’ behavior and therefore make optimal strategic choices
by fully anticipating all followers’ actions.
A strategy Si then specifies for player i the full contingency plan of actions she would choose for
each potential choice of actions A<i := (A1, . . . ,Ai−1) chosen by her predecessors. We use Si(A<i)
to denote the action that i plays under strategy Si when A<i is the vector of actions chosen by
players 1, . . . , i− 1. We refer to a choice of strategies S = (S1, . . . , Sn) by each of the players as a
strategy profile. Note the explicit distinction between action (profile) and strategy (profile). The
outcome resulting from S is then the set of actions chosen by the players when they play according
to the strategy profile S.
Subgame perfect equilibria, defined by Selten [36], are defined as strategy profiles S that induce
Nash equilibria in any subgame of the extensive form game. In other words, a strategy profile S is a
subgame perfect equilibrium if for all i and for any choice of actions A<i of players 1, . . . , i−1, player
i cannot decrease her cost by switching to an action different from Si(A<i), in the subgame where
the actions of 1, . . . , i− 1 are fixed to A<i, and players i+ 1, . . . , n play strategies (Si+1, . . . , Sn).
Subgame perfect equilibria reflect farsighted strategic behaviour of players that observe the state
of the game and reason strategically about choices of subsequent players, always choosing the
action that will minimize their individual cost. Analogous to (1), the sequential price of anarchy
of an instance I is defined by
SPoA(I) = max
SPE∈SPE(I)
C(SPE)
C(OPT )
, (2)
where SPE(I) denotes the set of all outcomes of subgame perfect equilibria of instance I. The se-
quential price of anarchy of a class of instances I is defined as in [33] by SPoA(I) = supI∈I SPoA(I).
Throughout the paper, when the class of instances is clear from the context, we write PoA and SPoA.
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A11
A21
A12
player 1
player 2
A22 A21 A22
Figure 1. Game tree for a symmetric sequential two player game. Nodes are the states. Note that A11 and A21
are actions of players one and two respectively, but denote the same action (recall that we have a symmetric game).
The same holds for for A12 and A22. Fat lines denote a subgame perfect strategy S = (S1, S2) where S1 = A12,
S2(A11) =A21 and S2(A12) =A22. The outcome resulting from S is (A12,A22), the rightmost path of the game tree.
Extensive form games can be represented in a game tree, see Figure 1 for an example, with the
nodes on level i representing the possible states of the game that a single player i can encounter,
and the arcs emanating from any node representing the possible actions of that player in the given
state. The nodes of the game tree are called information sets or states. We will refer to a state by
a pair (A<i, i) where A<i is the choice of actions of the players 1, . . . , i− 1 in that state, and i is
the next player who has to choose her action. Since we deal with a game with perfect information,
subgame perfect equilibria can be computed by backwards induction. In particular, it is known
that subgame perfect equilibria always exist; see e.g. [32]. Note, however, that if S is a subgame
perfect equilibrium, the resulting outcome A need not be a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
strategic form game, as will also be discussed in the next section.
4. The price of anarchy for symmetric network routing In this section we first focus
on the regular price of anarchy PoA as defined in (1) for symmetric network routing games with
linear cost functions. We show that it equals (5n− 2)/(2n+ 1), n being the number of players.
This resolves an open question regarding the price of anarchy of network congestion games of
Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [12], see also [8]. Indeed, it is well known that the price of anarchy
of the more general class of linear symmetric (not necessarily network) congestion games is at most
(5n− 2)/(2n+ 1) [12]. It was not clear, however, whether this bound is can also be attained with
symmetric linear network routing games. Here we settle that issue and give a matching lower bound
of (5n−2)/(2n+ 1). Surprisingly, the lower bound is conceptually simpler than the one previously
provided for the more general class of (non-network) affine congestion games [12].
Theorem 1. The price of anarchy of symmetric linear network routing games with n players
equals (5n− 2)/(2n+ 1).
Proof. We construct the following family of instances. For 3 players, the instance (along with
the optimal and equilibrium strategies) is depicted in Figure 2. In general, let n be the number of
Correa et al.: Inefficiency of Equilibria for Network Routing
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s t
P1
P2
P3
s t
OPT
NE
2
2
1 1 1
111
1 1 12 2
2
2
Z1
Z2
Z3
00
00
00
00
v1,1 v1,2 v1,3 v1,4
v2,1 v2,2 v2,3 v2,4
v2,1 v2,2 v2,3 v2,4
e1,1
e1,2 e1,3 e1,4
e1,5
e2,2 e2,3 e2,4e2,1 e2,5
e3,2 e3,3 e3,4
e3,1 e3,5
Figure 2. A lower bound instance for the PoA for n= 3. Players travel from s to t.
players and consider an instance in which there are n disjoint paths from the source s to the sink
t, which we refer to as principal paths. These paths are all composed of 2n− 1 arcs and thus 2n
nodes (s being the first and t being the last), so we denote by ei,j the j-th arc of the i-th path,
for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,2n− 1, and by vi,j the j-th node of the i-th path, for i = 1, . . . , n
and j = 1, . . . ,2n. There are n · (n− 1) additional connecting arcs that connect these paths: there
is an arc from vi,2k+1 to vi−1,2k for k = 1, . . . , n− 1, where i− 1 is taken mod (n). This defines
the network. The cost coefficients on the arcs are set as follows. Arcs ei,1 (that start from s) have
cost coefficient ae = 2, arcs ei,2n−1 (that end in t) have cost coefficient ae = 2, and arcs ei,j with
1< j < 2n− 1 have cost coefficient ae = 1. All connecting arcs have cost coefficient ae = 0.
It is easy to check that the optimal solution in this instance is to route one player in each of the
principal paths. Since in this solution no two players intersect in any arc, its cost can be computed
as n(2 + 2n− 3 + 2) = n(2n+ 1). On the other hand a Nash equilibrium is obtained when each
player k follows the following path: she starts with arcs ek,1, ek,2, then uses all arcs of the form
ek+j,2j, ek+j,2j+1, ek+j,2j+2 for j = 1, . . . , n− 2, and finishes with arcs ek+n−1,2n−2, ek+n−1,2n−1, and
uses all the required connecting arcs. Here, the additions on the principal paths index are taken
mod (n). In this solution every arc ei,j with j even is used exactly twice while every other arc is
used only once. Thus the social cost is n(n−1) ·4 +n(n−2) ·1 + 2n ·2 = n(5n−2). It immediately
follows that the PoA of the instance is at least (5n− 2)/(2n+ 1).
The remainder of the proof consists in checking that the latter path choices indeed result in a
Nash equilibrium. Consider a player, which by symmetry we may assume is player 1, and let us
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evaluate possible deviations from the current path which we call the zig-zag path Z. Note that in
any path an arc ei,2j−1 is always followed by ei,2j for 2≤ j ≤ n− 1, and that player 1 evaluates the
joint cost of these two arcs as either 5 (if not in the zig-zag path) or 3 (if in the zig-zag path). Now
assume player 1 follows a path P not intersecting Z in arcs of the form ei,2j−1 for j = 1, . . . , n, then
the cost of this path is at least (n−2) ·5 + 8 = 5n−2 (the extra 8 comes from the arc starting in s
and the arc ending in t), and thus the deviation is not profitable. Therefore we may assume that
P and Z do intersect in arcs of the form ei,2j−1. Since these arcs are in Z they actually are of the
form ei,2i−1. Assume there are two such arcs, and consider two of these intersection arcs ei,2i−1 and
ek,2k−1 such that there is no other intersection arc on the path segment of P that runs from ei,2i−1
to ek,2k−1. The cost of the restricted Z path between nodes vi,2i and vk,2k−1 is 3 + 5(k − i− 1),
whereas path P has to cost at least 5(k − i − 1) just to get to a node of the form vl,2k−1 plus
what it needs to pay to get to the principal path k, which is at least 3. The total cost is thus at
least 3 + 5(k − i− 1) implying that the deviation P restricted to the segment between any two
edges intersecting with Z is not profitable. Finally we consider the subpath between s and the first
such intersection, say ei,2i−1 (and symmetrically between the last and t). In this case the cost of
the restricted Z path between nodes s and vi,2i is 6 + (i− 2)5, whereas the cost of P is at least
4 + 3 + (i− 2)5. Here, the 4 comes from the first arc and the 3 from the second arc. Again the
deviation cannot be profitable. We thus conclude that Z is indeed a best response and thus we
have a Nash equilibrium. 
5. Sequential games and equilibria for n= 2 players As a way to illustrate the difficulties
in arguing about subgame perfect equilibria in general, we first focus on the special case with
only two players. Doing that, we point out two phenomena that clarify the fundamental difference
between the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and that of Nash equilibrium.
First we derive a simple instance in which the resulting actions of a subgame perfect equilibrium
do not correspond to a Nash equilibrium. This is in contrast to the case of parallel links [15] and
also to the crowding games as studied by Milchtaich [31]. This effect is the major complication in
analyzing subgame perfect equilbria, and it seems it can be circumvented if the underlying game
is generic, meaning that no player is ever confronted with a tie; see [31, 11], and [20] for network
routing games in particular.
Based on this particular instance we additionally prove that the sequential price of anarchy for
the two player case equals 7/5. This is smaller than the regular price of anarchy which is equal to
8/5 [12], and also smaller than the sequential price of anarchy for the asymmetric network routing
case, which equals 3/2 [15].3 Secondly, we show that even in the two-player case, computing the
outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium is NP-hard.
3 In [15] a lower bound example is given for general congestion games which can be easily transformed to network
routing games.
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5.1. The sequential price of anarchy Consider the two-player instance depicted in Fig-
ure 3, with five vertices and eight arcs. The vertices 1,2,3,4,5 are numbered from left to right and
from top to bottom so that s= 1 and t= 5. The linear cost coefficients ae are given by the numbers
next to the respective arcs e.
1
2
0
1 0
1
0
4
s t
1
2
4
s
OPT SPE
0
1 0
1
0
t
player 1
player 2
player 1
player 2
Figure 3. Lower bound example for 2 players. Each arcs is labeled with the coefficients of the linear cost function
associated to it. There are two parallel arcs emanating from s: The purpose of the arc with the higher coefficient is
to cause player 2 to be indifferent between the two arcs in case player 1 uses the arc with the lower coefficient. This
makes sure that there exists an SPE that results in the the action profile depicted on the right hand side.
There are two parallel arcs between vertices 1 and 2. In the discussion below, whenever we specify
that a player takes a path that includes an arc from 1 to 2, that player uses the parallel arc with
the lower of the two coefficients. It can be easily verified that the following is a subgame perfect
equilibrium:
• Player 1 chooses path (1,2,3,4,5).
• Player 2 chooses:
— (1,5) if player 1 chooses (1,2,3,4,5),
— (1,2,4,5) if player 1 chooses (1,2,3,5),
— (1,2,3,5) if player 1 chooses (1,2,4,5),
— Any (best response) path for all remaining choices of player 1.
In this equilibrium outcome player 1 chooses the dashed path on the right, that is, path
(1,2,3,4,5), while player 2 chooses the dotted path on the right, which is simply the arc going
directly from 1 to 5. Interestingly, one may think that player 1 has an incentive to deviate to the
path (1,2,3,5) since the cost of going straight from 3 to 5 is 0. However, if player one does this,
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player two would pick path (1,2,4,5) and therefore player 1’s cost would still be 3. This implies
that indeed the outcome of the subgame perfect equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium. Note fur-
thermore that player 1’s cost is 3 and player 2’s is 4, for a total social cost of 7, while in the
socially optimal situation, depicted to the left of the figure, the social cost is 5. So in particular
this instance shows that the SPoA is at least 7/5.
In the above instance, the subgame perfect equilibrium is not unique. However, the latencies
can be slightly perturbed so that uniqueness is achieved, while the cost of the equilibrium remains
arbitrarily close to 7 and that of the optimum remains arbitrarily close to 5. To this end consider
the same instance but change the cost coefficient of arc (1,2) from 2 to 2+ , that of arc (1,5) from
4 to 4 + , and those of arcs (2,4) and (3,5) from 0 to .
With the latter observation not only the sequential price of anarchy but also the sequential price
of stability4 equals 7/5 in the two-player case. This is because it is possible to prove a matching
upper bound, even for the more general class of symmetric affine (not necessarily network) con-
gestion games. It uses a proof technique based on linear programming, but is nonetheless different
from the proof used in [15] where linear programming is also used to derive upper bounds on the
SPoA. The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 2. The sequential price of anarchy of symmetric linear network routing games and
symmetric affine congestion games is 7/5 when there are two players only.
Proof. It follows from the example above that the SPoA for two-player linear network routing
games is at least 7/5, so it only remains to show that 7/5 is also an upper bound. The proof goes by
establishing a set of valid inequalities that must be fulfilled for any outcome of a subgame perfect
equilibrium (A1,A2) and any outcome (A
∗
1,A
∗
2) that minimizes the total cost. After applying several
combinatorial arguments, we arrive at the matching upper bound of 7/5 via linear programming.
The details of these arguments that complete the proof of Theorem 2, together with a combinatorial
argument to show that the underlying linear program has 7/5 as an optimal solution, can be found
in Lemma 2 in the appendix. 
5.2. Hardness of computing subgame perfect equilibria Notice that the encoding of
subgame perfect strategies can, in general, require super-polynomial space in terms of the input size
of a network routing game. This is even the case for two players, for example if the first player has
a super-polynomial number of possible actions, i.e., (s, t)-paths. Then, for each of these potential
actions of player one, a subgame perfect equilibrium needs to prescribe the respective actions taken
4 Just like the price of stability as defined in [4, 3], the sequential price of stability is the ratio of the outcome of the
best subgame perfect equilibrium over the optimum.
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by player two. We head for a meaningful statement, however, with respect to the input size of a
network routing game, and not the output. Therefore we consider the computational problem to
only output the outcome resulting from a subgame perfect equilibrium. This exactly corresponds to
a single path in the game tree, which for two players has depth two. This outcome has polynomial
size, as it consists of just one path in the network G per player. The problem to compute such an
equilibrium path in the game tree, however, turns out to be hard.
Theorem 3. Computing an action profile resulting from a subgame perfect equilibrium is
(strongly) NP-hard for any number of players n≥ 2.
Proof. We prove the theorem by a reduction from the Hamiltonian path problem, where the task
is to determine whether a given undirected graph has a Hamiltonian path, i.e., a path that visits
each vertex of the graph exactly once. Consider any instance of Hamiltonian path on undirected
graph G= (V,E), where we assume without loss of generality that G is connected and has at least
one edge. We construct the following game: There are n players. There are two copies v′, v′′ for each
node v ∈ V . There is also a source node s, a sink node t, and a node s′. We define m= 2|V |+1, and
= 1/(|E|−1). There is an arc with cost coefficient m from s to s′, and an arc with cost coefficient
(2m+ 3)/(n−1) from s to t. For each v ∈ V , there is an arc with cost coefficient 0 from s′ to v′, an
arc with cost coefficient 2 from v′ to v′′, and an arc with cost coefficient 0 from v′′ to t. Moreover,
for each arc (u, v)∈E, there is an arc with cost coefficient  from u′′ to v′. This reduction is shown
in Figure 4.
We claim that in an outcome resulting from a subgame perfect equilibrium, player 1 chooses all
arcs (v′, v′′) that correspond to all v ∈ V . If the graph is Hamiltonian she will choose these arcs
exactly in the order of a Hamiltonian path, and otherwise will have to traverse at least one arc
(v′, v′′) twice. Moreover, all subsequent players choose the arc (s, t).
Let us argue that indeed, this is the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium. First note that
if for at least one node v, player 1 does not choose arc (v′, v′′), then there is some successor that
will choose the path (s, s′, v′, v′′, t). Let us call this player j. Then j has a cost of at most 2m+ 2,
because all other players will play (s, t). The latter is due to the high cost of 3m that the third
player would have if she would choose arc (s, s′) (while choosing (s, t) would guarantee her a lower
cost of at most 2m+ 3). So, in this case, player 1 has a cost of at least 2m+ 2.
On the other hand, if player 1 chooses all arcs (v′, v′′), then for any succeeding player, choosing
any path using an arc (v′, v′′) would yield her a cost of at least 2m+ 4. In that case, choosing (s, t)
is always a better option for any succeeding player, because doing so guarantees that her cost is at
most 2m+ 3.
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Figure 4. Reducing a Hamiltonian path instance to an n-player network routing game.
Now, suppose there exists a Hamiltonian path in G. Let us look at the cost of player 1 if she
chooses the arcs (v′, v′′) that correspond to all v ∈ V , in the order of the Hamiltonian path. Then
player 1’s cost is at most m+ 2|V |+ |V − 1|< 2m, because, as we showed, succeeding players will
choose (s, t).
If no Hamiltonian path exists, then for player 1, any path that contains all arcs (v′, v′′) uses at
least |V | arcs with cost coefficient , since she will have to use at least one arc (v′, v′′) twice. This
yields player 1 a cost of at least m+ 2|V |+ |V |.
From the above we conclude the following: if there is a Hamiltonian path in G, then there is an
action A1 for player 1 that gives her a cost of m+ 2|V |+ |V − 1| when the succeeding players all
play a subgame perfect strategy profile. Moreover, playing any action other than A1 will give player
1 a strictly higher cost when the succeeding players all play a subgame perfect strategy profile.
Therefore, if there exists a Hamiltonian path, player 1 plays A1 in a subgame perfect equilibrium,
and have a cost of m+ 2|V |+ |V − 1|. If there is no Hamiltonian path in G, then in any subgame
perfect equilibrium, player 1 has a cost of at least m+ 2|V |+ |V |.
Hence, if we were able to compute the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium in polynomial
time, we could verify in polynomial time if the cost of player 1 equals m+ 2|V |+ |V − 1| or not.
This would allow to decide the Hamiltonian path problem in polynomial time. 
Recall that membership in NP is not clear in general, because it is generally not clear how to
verify subgame perfectness in polynomial time. However if we define a decision problem SPE-DEC
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that asks if the first player can guarantee herself a cost at most equal to some threshold k in a
subgame perfect equilibrium, we can also show the following.
Theorem 4. Decision problem SPE-DEC is NP-complete for the case of two players.
Proof. By Theorem 3, SPE-DEC is NP-hard, so we only need to prove that SPE-DEC is
contained in NP. We use the subgame perfect action profile (A1,A2) as a certificate for a yes-
instance. We can verify in polynomial time by a shortest path algorithm, that A2, the action chosen
by player two is subgame perfect. For player 1 we do not have a way to verify that A1 is a subgame
perfect action, but we do not need to: we simply verify if the cost of player 1 is indeed at most k
for the action profile (A1,A2). If yes, player 1 can guarantee herself cost at most k by choosing A1,
so in any subgame perfect equilibrium, player 1 will have cost at most that much. Hence we can
verify the validity of the certificate for any yes-instance in polynomial time. 
6. The sequential price of anarchy for symmetric network routing games. We now
prove our main result, namlely that the SPoA of symmetric network routing games is unbounded.
Theorem 5. The sequential price of anarchy of symmetric network routing games with linear
cost functions is not bounded by any constant.
We prove the theorem by constructing a sequence of lower bound instances where the sequential
price of anarchy gets arbitrarily large. Intuitively, the construction of these instances works as
follows. There are slightly more players than disjoint (s, t)-paths. As an effect of our construction,
it will turn out that the last player has to necessarily share every arc in her chosen action with
one other player. That will result in the situation that this player can credibly “threaten” any
other player j by choosing the arcs that player j chooses, if player j does not stick to a certain
action. More generally, we extend this idea so that a whole group of players can force a common
predecessor into a certain action. This is achieved in such a way that the “concerted” threatening
is not too expensive for every single threatener, but very expensive for the common predecessor.
Altogether, the goal of the construction is to incentivize a large number of players to choose a set
of arcs, much larger than in the optimal outcome, so as to drive the sequential price of anarchy to
infinity. The challenging aspect is to make sure that this is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium.
6.1. Definition of instance Γx Formally, in order to obtain a sequential price of anarchy of
x, where x≥ 4 is a square number, we construct the following instance Γx: Let p be a sufficiently
large integer. There are n = p
√
x + 5x2 players. The network consists of x segments Ri, i ∈ [x].
Segment Ri consists of 2(1+p
√
x+4x2) nodes {i, (2i,1), (2i,2), . . . , (2i, p√x+4x2), (2i+1,1), (2i+
1,2), . . . , (2i+ 1, p
√
x+ 4x2), i+ 1}. Note that node i+ 1 is in both segments Ri and Ri+1. The arc
set is defined as follows.
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Figure 5. A lower bound instance of a network routing game. Players travel from s to t.
• There is an arc e with cost coefficient ae = 0 from node i to node (2i, j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , (p
√
x+
4x2)}.
• There is an arc e with cost coefficient ae = 1/x, from (2i, j) to (2i+1, j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , (p
√
x+
4x2)}.
• There is an arc e with cost coefficient ae = 0 from (2i+1, j) to i+1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , (p
√
x+4x2)}.
• There is an arc e with cost coefficient ae = 0 from (2i+ 1, j) to (2i, k) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , (p
√
x+
4x2)} and for all k ∈ {j+ 1, . . . , (p√x+ 4x2)}.
Note that between any two nodes i, i+ 1, there exist 2p
√
x+4x2 different paths: one for every subset
of arcs with cost coefficient 1/x of segment Ri. For brevity, when we refer from now on to arcs,
we mean the arcs of which the cost coefficient is not identically zero, i.e., arcs with cost coefficient
1/x.
Node 1 is the source s, and node x+ 1 is the sink t. Now any feasible action of a player consists
of at least one arc from each segment Ri, i∈ [x]. This example is shown in Figure 5.
In the remainder of the section, we say that in a state (A<i, i), an arc e is free if no player in
[i− 1] has chosen e in her action, i.e., there does not exist an i′ ∈ [i− 1] such that e∈Ai′ .
6.2. Optimal social cost of Γx In the optimal outcome A
∗, each player chooses exactly one
arc from each segment, and players share arcs as little as possible. Straightforward counting based
on the above definitions yields that the optimal social cost is
C(A∗) = p
√
x+ 3x2 + (2x2)2 = p
√
x+ 7x2.
6.3. Definiton of strategy profile S for Γx In order to describe our worst-case subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy, we first define the following actions. Note that these actions are defined
relative to a given state in the game. The actions Greedy and Copy are well-defined for each state,
while the actions Punish(j) and Fill only exist for a subset of the states.
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• Greedy : In each segment, choose the single arc chosen by the least number of players. In case of
ties, the tie-breaking rule as described below is used.
• Punish(j) (for j ∈ [n]): Denote by R a segment where all arcs chosen by player j are chosen by
in total less than x players from [j]. Denote by e an arc from R that is chosen by the largest
number of players among the arcs chosen by j, breaking ties in a consistent way. The action
Punish(j) is then defined as choosing e in R, and any free arc in each other segment.
• Fill : Choose √x free arcs in each segment.
• Copy : Choose exactly the same arcs as the previous player.
Using these actions, we now define our subgame perfect equilibrium S = (S1, . . . , Sn) for Γx. For
each state (A<i, i), strategy Si prescribes to play an action Si(A<i), which is determined as in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Definition of subgame perfect equilibrium S (for player i).
1: if Every player j ∈ [i− 1] plays according to Sj then
2: if i has at least 5x2 successors then
3: if i is the first player, or if the previous
√
x− 1 players chose Copy then
4: Fill
5: else
6: Copy
7: else
8: Greedy
9: else
10: if exactly 1 player j ∈ [i− 1] does not play according to Sj then
11: if j has chosen less than x2 arcs in each segment then
12: if Sj prescribed j to choose Fill or Copy then
13: if there exists a segment such that all arcs e chosen by j contain less than x players
in total then
14: Punish(j)
15: else
16: Greedy
17: else
18: Greedy
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6.4. Tie-breaking rule. In Algorithm 1, when the strategy Si prescribes that a player i
chooses an arc chosen by the largest number of players, any arbitrary fixed tie-breaking rule is used.
Secondly, when the strategy Si prescribes that a player i chooses an arch chosen by the smallest
number of players, and a set E′ of multiple arcs have this property, the following tie-breaking rule
is used: All predecessors of i are ordered. The set of all players that deviate from S comes first in
this ordering. After that comes the set of all other players. Within these two sets, the players are
ordered by index from high to low. Now the arcs are ordered as follows: Arc e is ordered before
e′ iff the set of players on e is lexographically less than the set of players on e′ according to the
ordering on the players just defined. Finally, ties are broken by choosing the first arc in this order,
among the arcs in E′.
Example 1. As an example to clarify the tie-breaking rule, consider the following situation:
Say player 5 has to choose 2 arcs among arc set {e1, e2, e2, e4}, which are chosen by the small-
est number of players. Players 1 and 3 have deviated from S. Player 1 has chosen, among arcs
{e1, e2, e3, e4} the two arcs e2 and e3, player 2 has chosen arcs e3 and e4, player 3 has chosen arcs
e1 and e4, and player 4 has chosen arcs e1 and e2. Thus, the players are ordered 3,1,4,2 and the
arcs are ordered e4, e1, e3, e2, so player 5 chooses arcs e4 and e1. /
Observe first that S is well-defined:
• In any state, Si prescribes i to play either Greedy, Copy, Fill, or Punish(j) for some j ∈ [i− 1].
• In any state, the actions Greedy and Copy always exist.
• Whenever the action Fill is prescribed, then by line 1, no player in [i− 1] has deviated from
S. Combined with line 2 this means that in each segment there are at most p
√
x arcs that are
chosen by at least one player in [i− 1]. Therefore, there is guaranteed to be enough free arcs in
each segment, so the action Fill exists in any state where Si prescribes i to choose Fill.
• Whenever the action Punish(j) is prescribed, for some j ∈ [i− 1], then from line 12 and line 2 it
follows that j ∈ [p√x−x2]. Also, from line 10 it follows that in each segment, the total number
of arcs chosen by players in [j−1] (who all play Fill and Copy) is at most p√x−x2 +√x< p√x,
and player j chooses at most x2 arcs in each segment by line 11. Moreover, it follows from line
10 that players in {j+ 1, . . . , i−1} have not deviated from S and have therefore chosen only one
arc in each segment (as they all have played Punish(j)). From line 13 it follows that the number
of players between j and i is at most x2, so the total number of arcs chosen in each segment,
by players in {j + 1, . . . , i− 1}, is at most x2. Lastly, line 11 certifies that player j occupies at
most x2 arcs in each segment. So, in a single segment, the total number of arcs used by players
in [i−1] is at most p√x+ 3x2. Thus, when Si prescribes Punish(j), each segment has a free arc.
Moreover, by line 13, there is a segment in which all arcs chosen by player j are chosen by less
than x players from [j]. Therefore, Punish(j) exists in any state where Si prescribes i to choose
Punish(j).
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6.5. Social cost of S. If each player i chooses the action prescribed by Si, then the social
cost is at least
(p
√
x)(
√
x
√
x) + 3x2 + (2x2)2 = p
√
xx+ 7x2.
If we denote by A the outcome induced by S, we see that
lim
p→∞
C(A)/C(A∗) = lim
p→∞
(px
√
x+ 7x2)/(p
√
x+ 7x2) = x.
.
6.6. Checking that S is a subgame perfect equilibrium. For a state (A<i, i), an action
Ai is said to be subgame perfect with respect to a sequential strategy profile S iff choosing Ai
minimizes i’s cost when players 1 to i− 1 play A<i, and players i+ 1 to n play according to S.
The following lemma and corollary shows that S is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Lemma 1. For each state (A<i, i) of Γx, action Si(A<i) is subgame perfect with respect to S.
Proof. For each of the possible actions Greedy, Fill, Punish(j) (where j ∈ [i− 1]), and Copy,
that Si may prescribe to player i in state (A<i, i), we prove that deviating from this prescription
will not decrease the cost of player i, under the assumption that all succeeding players i+ 1, . . . , n
play according to S.
• Suppose player i is prescribed by Si to play Fill or Copy. Then no player in [i− 1] has deviated
from S. Therefore, assuming that all succeeding players play according to S as well, the cost of
player i when she does not deviate is x. If player i does deviate, then the subsequent players will
play Punish(i), which makes sure that in each segment one of the arcs chosen by i gets chosen
by at least x players. Her cost will therefore be at least x. Thus, deviating is not beneficial for
player i.
• Suppose player i is prescribed by Si to play Greedy. Then, assuming that players i+ 1, . . . , n all
play according to S as well, observe that by definition of S, players i+1, . . . , n play Greedy, even
if player i deviates from playing Greedy. We denote by A the outcome that results if i does not
deviate from Si. We show that if i does deviate, then in each segment, i’s costs are at least as
high as in A. Let j ∈ [x] and consider segment Rj. Let ei and en denote the arcs from Rj chosen
by respectively player i and player n in A. Denote by R the set of arcs in Rj chosen by players
i, . . . , n in A.
We denote by c the number of players choosing arc en in A. Any arc e ∈R has cost either c/x
or (c− 1)/x: If it were higher, then the last player who chose e would have chosen en, because
she plays greedily. Specifically, the cost of ei is at most c/x. Also, any arc e ∈Rj that is not in
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R is chosen by at least c− 1 players of [i− 1]: If this were false, then in A player n would have
chosen e instead of en.
Now consider outcome A′ which occurs when player i deviates from Si. If player i chooses any
arc e′i that is not in R, then this arc has cost at least c/x. We now show that if e
′
i is in R, then
it has cost at least c/x as well. In that case, if any player i′ ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n} chooses an arc not
in R then all arcs in R would yield cost at least c/x: If there would be an arc e′ ∈R with cost
(c−1)/x, then the tie-breaking rule dictates that i′ would have chosen e′i instead of e′. However,
if all players i, . . . , n choose an arc in R, then player n has cost at least c/x. Combining this
with the tie-breaking rule, we conclude that e′i has a cost of at least c/x as well. Therefore, in
all cases the costs of player i does not decrease by deviating.
• Suppose player i is prescribed by Si to play Punish(j) for some j ∈ [i − 1]. Let us compute
first the cost of i if she would follow this prescription, assuming that players i + 1, . . . , n all
play according to S. Then observe that by definition of S, there is a number of other players
succeeding i that play Punish(j) as well. Let k be this number of players. So: {j + 1, . . . , i+ k}
is the set of players that play Punish(j). Let ` = |{j + 1, . . . , i+ k}|. Players {i+ k + 1, . . . , n}
play Greedy, again by definition of S. Players in [j− 1] together occupy at most j− 2 +√x arcs
in each segment. Player j occupies at most x2 arcs in each segment. Players j + 1, . . . , i+ k all
choose Punish(j), so they each occupy one arc per segment. The total number of arcs occupied
per segment by players in [i+ k] is therefore j − 2 + x2 + `+√x. Therefore, there are at least
F := (p− 1)√x+ 3x2 − j − `+ 2 free arcs per segment after the first i+ k players have chosen
their action. The set i+ k+ 1, . . . , n is of size G := p
√
x+ 5x2− j− `. We see that
G
F
=
p
√
x+ 5x2− j− `
(p− 1)√x+ 3x2− j− `+ 2 ≤
p
√
x+ 6x2− j− `
(1/2)
√
x+ 3x2− (1/2)j− (1/2)` = 2,
so the Greedy players will choose only those free arcs. I.e., by the tie-breaking rule the Greedy
players will not choose arcs of player i. Therefore, player i’s cost is exactly 2− 1/x if she plays
Punish(j): In x − 1 segments, i chooses one free arc that will not be chosen by any of her
successors as we have shown. In the remaining segment, i chooses an arc that player j has chosen,
which will be chosen by precisely x players.
Suppose now that i deviates from playing Punish(j). In that case, all succeeding players will
play Greedy. We prove that in each segment, i’s costs are at least 2/x, so that her total cost is at
least 2. All players in [j − 1] together occupy at least j − 1 arcs per segment. This implies that
in state (A<i, i) in each segment there are at least j−1 occupied arcs and at most p
√
x+4x2− j
free arcs. The number of players succeeding i is p
√
x+ 5x2 − i≥ p√x+ 4x2 − j + x, where the
inequality holds since i≤ j + x2 − x, which is true because by the definition of S, there are at
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most x2−x players choosing Punish(j). Therefore, there exist players among the Greedy players
who choose in each segment an arc that is occupied by at least one player. The tie-breaking rule
for the Greedy action then makes sure that the first such a Greedy player chooses in each segment
an arc on which i is the sole player, in case such an arc exists. Therefore, when i deviates, her
cost in each segment is at least 2/x. 
Now we can finish the proof of Theorem 5.
Corollary 1. The strategy profile S is a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γx.
Proof. Recalling the definition of a subgame perfect equilibrium, we have to prove that for all
i ∈ [n] and for each state (A<i, i) it holds that the action Si(A<i) that i plays under S minimizes
her cost in the subgame corresponding to state (A<i, i), when the remaining players play according
to S. This follows directly from Lemma 1 and from the way we defined subgame perfection of an
action with respect to strategy profile S. 
Although the SPoA is not bounded by any constant, it is not hard to see that it is trivially
upper bounded by the number of players, n. This holds as for nonnegative, affine cost functions,
n is the maximum multiplicative gap between the congestion of any given resource, for any two
arbitrary action profiles. Our construction above shows actually a lower bound SPoA ≥ Ω(√n).
To see this, we choose p = x
√
x. Then n = x2 + 5x2 = 6x2 which yields x =
√
n/6. Now, SPoA ≥
(x3 + 7x2)/(x2 + 7x2) ≥ x3/(8x2) = x/8 = √n/(8√6). If instances can be constructed where the
sequential price of anarchy is asymptotically worse than
√
n, remains open.
7. Discussion. The central result of this paper states that the sequential price of anarchy is
generally unbounded for symmetric affine network routing games. One property that stands out
in our lower bound constructions is that it admits multiple subgame perfect equilibria. In fact,
there even exists a subgame perfect equilibrium that induces an optimal strategy profile, and the
existence of a poorly performing subgame perfect equilibrium relies crucially on bad tie breaking.
Recent results for for a special case, namely so-called “EP graphs”, shows that indeed, the sequential
price of anarchy is no longer unbounded if we consider generic games, i.e., those games admitting
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium; see [20]. We do not know, however, if the sequential price
of anarchy is bounded for all symmetric congestion games that are generic. That question relates
to determining the sequential price of stability of symmetric network routing games.
Finally, note that our main result is asymptotic for large n. In view of concrete applications, it
may be interesting to pin down the exact value for small numbers of n; here we did that for n= 2.
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Appendix. Proof of upper bound for Theorem 2.
We here give the missing proof of the 7/5 upper bound for sequentially played affine congestion
games with n= 2 players.
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Lemma 2. The sequential price of anarchy of symmetric affine congestion games is at most
7/5 when there are n= 2 players only.
Because we consider non-network congestion games for this upper bound proof, we use the
term resources instead of arcs. Consider any symmetric affine congestion game with 2 players, m
resources, affine cost functions (c1, . . . , cm) and the set R ⊆ 2[m] such that the action set of both
players is R. We first show that we may assume without loss of generality that all the cost functions
are of the form ce(y) = y. This is because we can transform any symmetric affine congestion game
as follows: First, by scaling all the cost functions simultaneously by an appropriate constant, we
may assume that each cost function ce is of the form ce(y) = aey+ be, with ae and be being natural
numbers. (It is straightforward to do so when the original coefficients of the affine cost functions
are rational. In case the original coefficients are irrational, additionally one must first turn such an
instance into an equivalent one where the coefficients are approximated by rational numbers.) For
a resource e where ae 6= 1 or be 6= 0 we may replace each action A′ ∈R that contains e by two new
strategies: A1 = (A′ \ e)∪ {e′j : j ∈ [ae]} ∪ {e′′j : j ∈ [be]} and A2 = (A′ \ e)∪ {e′j : j ∈ [ae]} ∪ {e′′′j : j ∈
[be]}, where for all j, the resources e′j, e′′j and e′′′j are newly introduced into the game, and all these
newly introduced resources have cost functions of the form ce(y) = y. There is a natural mapping
from the old outcomes to the new outcomes: for player 1, action A′ is mapped to A1, and for player
2, action A′ is mapped to A2. Note that, since the transformed game is still symmetric, action A2
can be chosen by player 1 and action A1 can be chosen by player 2. However, the two players will
not both choose action A1 if be > 0 since player 2 could then improve her cost by choosing the
action A2, and a symmetric conclusion can be made if both players would choose action A2. Thus,
by this transformation, the sequential price of anarchy can only increase. This shows that we may
assume that the cost functions have the form ce(y) = y.
Now, let A∗ = (A∗1,A
∗
2) be an outcome that minimizes the social cost, and let A= (A1,A2) be
the outcome resulting from a subgame perfect equilibrium S = (S1, S2). We may assume w.l.o.g.
that c1(A
∗)≤ c2(A∗), because the action sets are symmetric. We first define some parameters that
we will use throughout this proof:
• Let x be the minimum cardinality of a set of resources in the action set R.
• Let α∈R be such that |A∗1 ∩A∗2|= αx.
• Let β be such that |A∗1 ∩A1|= β|A1|. Note that this implies that |A∗2 ∩A1| ≤ (1−β)|A1|+αx
• Let γ be such that C(A∗) = (2+γ)x. Observe that γ is positive, as 2x is a lower bound on C(A∗).
• Let δ be such that c1(A∗) = (1+δ)x. It holds that δ≤ γ/2 because c1(A∗)≤ c2(A∗). The definition
of δ implies that c2(A
∗) = (1 + γ− δ)x.
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We derive several upper bounds on C(A) that are expressed in terms of α,β, γ, and δ.
Observe first that each player experiences a cost of at most 2x under A, because there exists an
action of cardinality x of which each resource is chosen by at most two players.
Proposition 1.
c1(A)≤ 2x, c2(A)≤ 2x.
This gives us a straightforward upper bound of 4x on C(A). Note that in case γ ≥ 6/7, we obtain
that
C(A)
C(A∗)
≤ 4
20/7
=
7
5
,
so it remains to prove the claim for the case that γ ∈ [0,6/7], which we assume from now on.
We prove a second upper bound on C(A) next. By subgame perfection of S it holds that c1(A)≤
c1(A
∗
1, S2(A
∗
1)). Also, c2(A
∗
1, S2(A
∗
1)) ≤ c2(A∗1,A∗2) = (1 + γ − δ)x. The number x is defined as the
smallest cardinality of an action in R, so S2(A
∗
1) intersects with A
∗
1 in at most (γ− δ)x resources.
We combine the latter with the fact that the cardinality of A∗1 is (1 + δ − α)x, and we conclude
that c1(A
∗
1, S2(A
∗
1))≤ (1 + δ−α)x+ (γ− δ)x. Therefore:
Proposition 2.
c1(A)≤ (1 + γ−α)x.
Combining this with Proposition 1 gives us that
C(A)≤ (1 + γ−α)x+ 2x= (3 + γ−α)x. (3)
We prove two additional upper bounds on C(A) next. By subgame perfection of S it holds that
c2(A)≤ c2(A1,A∗1) and it holds that c2(A)≤ c2(A1,A∗2). The cost c2(A1,A∗1) can be upper bounded
as follows.
c2(A1,A
∗
1)≤ |A∗1|+ |A∗1 ∩A1| ≤ (1 + δ−α)x+β|A1|
≤ (1 + δ−α)x+βc1(A)
≤ (1 + δ−α)x+β(1 + γ−α)x,
where we use Proposition 2 for the last inequality. The cost c2(A1,A
∗
2) can be upper bounded as
follows.
c2(A1,A
∗
2)≤ |A∗2|+ |A∗2 ∩A1| ≤ (1 + γ− δ−α)x+ (1−β)|A1|+αx
≤ (1 + γ− δ)x+ (1−β)|A1|
≤ (1 + γ− δ)x+ (1−β)c1(A)
≤ (1 + γ− δ)x+ (1−β)(1 + γ−α)x.
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where we use Proposition 2 for the last inequality.
Combining the above two with Proposition 2 gives us
C(A) = c1(A) + c2(A)
≤ (1 + γ−α)x+ (1 + δ−α)x+β(1 + γ−α)x
= (1 + δ−α)x+ (1 +β)(1 + γ−α)x (4)
and
C(A) = c1(A) + c2(A)
≤ (1 + γ−α)x+ (1 + γ− δ)x+ (1−β)(1 + γ−α)x
= (1 + γ− δ)x+ (2−β)(1 + γ−α)x. (5)
Combining (3), (4), and (5), we conclude that the sequential price of anarchy of our game is at
most
min

(3 + γ−α)x,
(1 + δ−α)x+ (1 +β)(1 + γ−α)x,
(1 + γ− δ)x+ (2−β)(1 + γ−α)x

(2 + γ)x
=
min

(3 + γ−α),
(1 + δ−α) + (1 +β)(1 + γ−α),
(1 + γ− δ) + (2−β)(1 + γ−α)

(2 + γ)
We can obtain a concrete upper bound on the sequential price of anarchy of the complete class
two-player symmetric affine congestion games when we maximize the latter expression subject to
the constraints γ ∈ [0,6/7], β ∈ [0,1], δ ∈ [0,1/2γ]. The variable α can be eliminated, as it is clear
that the maximum is attained when α= 0. This results in the optimization problem
max
{
min{(3 + γ), (1 + δ) + (1 +β)(1 + γ), (3−β)(1 + γ)− δ}
(2 + γ)
,
: 0≤ γ ≤ 6
7
,0≤ β ≤ 1,0≤ δ≤ γ
2
}
.
Numerically solving this program gives that the solution is 7/5, attained when we take γ = β =
1/2, δ = 1/4, although this does not comprise a formal proof. However, it is possible to prove
formally that the solution does not exceed 7/5, by showing that the optimal solution to the following
optimization problem does not exceed zero:
max
min

(3 + γ),
(1 + δ) + (1 +β)(1 + γ),
(1 + γ− δ) + (2−β)(1 + γ)
−
7
5
(2 + γ)
: 0≤ γ ≤ 6
7
,0≤ β ≤ 1,0≤ δ≤ γ
2
}
. (6)
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We introduce an additional variable z that we use in order to eliminate the min-expression in the
objective function.
max
{
z− 7
5
(2 + γ)
: z ≤ 3 + γ, z ≤ (1 + δ) + (1 +β)(1 + γ),
z ≤ (1 + γ− δ) + (2−β)(1 + γ),
0≤ γ ≤ 6
7
,0≤ β ≤ 1,0≤ δ≤ γ
2
}
.
There are still two constraints in this program that are non-linear, because they contain the terms
γβ and −γβ respectively. We introduce a new variable ξ that we restrict to lie in [0,6/7] and
substitute the latter two terms by ξ and −ξ respectively. This results in the following linear
program, with an “enlarged” feasible region:
max
{
z− 7
5
(2 + γ)
: z ≤ 3 + γ, z ≤ 2 + δ+β+ γ+ ξ, z ≤ 3 + 3γ− δ−β− ξ,
0≤ γ ≤ 6
7
,0≤ β ≤ 1,0≤ δ≤ γ
2
,0≤ ξ ≤ 6/7
}
.
Because the set of feasible points of this linear program is larger, the solution to this linear program
is an upper bound to the solution of (6). The exact solution to this linear program can be obtained
by known algorithms, and turns out to be 0, as we needed to show. 
